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NONREPRESENTA-
TIONAL POLITICS
James Kuzner
The Third Citizen: Shakespeare’s 
Theater and the Early Modern House 
of Commons by Oliver Arnold. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2007. Pp. 325. 
$55.00 cloth.
Is representative democracy worth-
while? Not really, Oliver Arnold 
suggests in The Third Citizen. In 
this painstaking, lively, and pierc-
ing book, the author makes his case 
not with reference to the present 
moment but by attending to the 
rhetoric of the House of Commons 
and to Shakespeare’s attitudes to-
ward it. Arnold believes his ap-
proach needful for several reasons, 
ones that begin as disciplinary con-
cerns, then ramify outward. One 
reason is the continued infl uence 
of New  Historicism and its focus 
on “the subjectivity, ideology, and 
culture peculiar to monarchy” (25). 
Another is the tendency of revi-
sionist historians to accord the 
early modern Commons a passive 
role, that of a mere department of 
the crown. A third is the practice 
of “new Whig” critics who refute 
new historicists and revisionist his-
torians alike by shifting focus from 
the crown to the people who op-
posed it in hopes of protoliberal 
empowerment.
For Arnold, all three appro-
aches—emphasizing as they do the 
 political hierarchy’s top or bot-
tom—neglect a crucially important 
discourse that was emerging within 
the Commons and that articulates 
what the author calls “the politics 
of representation.” To be sure, 
Elizabethan and Jacobean knights 
and burgesses were elected to their 
seats in the Commons as were gen-
erations of previous members of 
Parliament (MPs), but the notion 
that MPs represented the people, 
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Arnold points out, was novel: “the 
claims [MPs] made to represent 
and speak for thousands of people 
were ‘ modern’ and unprecedented” 
(15). In focusing on the words of 
monarchs and the commonwealth’s 
members but not of members of 
parliament, historians and literary 
critics alike have largely ignored a 
concept of artifi cial personhood—
according to which an MP speaks 
not just for himself but for and 
even as the people—that was born 
in Shakespeare’s time and is inte-
gral to our thinking about repre-
sentative democracy today.
Arnold sees Shakespeare adop-
ting a radical position on represen-
tative politics. Arnold argues that 
“[t]he Whigs’ attempt to make 
Shakespeare our liberal contem-
porary” (11) is misguided—not 
 because Shakespeare was an abso-
lutist, or regarded the English 
 people with contempt, or was a re-
publican rather than a true demo-
crat, but because he portrays 
political representation as itself 
tragic. This is so because being 
represented deforms and disem-
powers the enfranchised subject, 
who is asked to hold a number of 
counterintuitive, crippling beliefs: 
for example, “that he was repre-
sentatively present at the political 
center (that he was at once home 
in Shropshire and present in St. 
 Stephen’s Chapel in London),” 
“that he empowered himself by 
empowering others,” and “that he 
attained a political voice by allow-
ing others to speak for him” (7). 
Shakespeare rejects each of these 
beliefs: “In Shakespeare’s canon,” 
Arnold writes, “there is not a sin-
gle exception to this rule: when 
they invest representatives with 
their voices, the people lose both 
power and their capacity to articu-
late cogently their aims and de-
sires” (12). In speaking for and 
even as the people, political repre-
sentatives make those people dis-
appear (13). Arnold believes that 
his turn to the birth of 
 representational rhetoric—and es-
pecially to Shakespeare’s critique 
of it—is particularly timely, for we 
now take that rhetoric for granted: 
“[E]arly modern observers,” Ar-
nold writes, “. . . may have some-
thing disquieting to tell us, the 
subjects of a representatio nalism 
so  entrenched as to seem  virtually 
natural and inevitable.” Sharing in 
Shakespeare’s wisdom, we might 
see how sinister this entrenchment 
is, might “consider whether the 
most fundamental contradictions 
and ideological misrecognitions of 
political representation in its prim-
itive form have been exorcised 
from, or simply work more effec-
tively in, its perfected form” (19).
The Third Citizen opens with a 
lengthy introduction followed by a 
full chapter that focuses—largely 
through parliamentary proceed-
ings—on the self-conception of the 
House of Commons, then moves 
into chapter-length readings of the 
First Tetralogy, Titus Andronicus 
and The Rape of Lucrece, Julius 
Caesar, and, lastly,  Coriolanus. Each 
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chapter takes extended recourse to 
historical materials, and the con-
texts in which Arnold charts 
Shakespeare’s tragedies of political 
representation are many, including 
the experience of parliamentary 
“elections”; disciplinary practices 
of the House of Commons (which 
claimed to be the mouth of lay-
people but  excluded them from 
meetings and kept proceedings 
completely secret); and theories of 
parliamentary representation, of 
the magic by which the absent peo-
ple were made present. The book 
thus has a broad appeal; it should 
be of interest not just to Shake-
speareans but also to the legions of 
historians and literary critics who 
study the Commons and its rela-
tionship to the rise of English 
 republicanism.
By and large, readers will be not 
just interested but compelled. With 
admirable precision and subtlety, 
Arnold pairs the politics articulated 
by MPs with Shakespeare’s demys-
tifi cations of them, often also with 
recourse to the bard’s rewriting of 
classical sources. For example, Ar-
nold explains nicely how, in Titus, 
Shakespeare revises Livy, for whom 
republicanism is the remedy to 
Tarquinism and to rape; Arnold 
argues that “to be represented in 
Titus’s Rome is not to gain a voice 
in state affairs but to lose one’s 
tongue” and that “muteness is the 
shared condition of the victim of 
rape and the victims of political 
representation,” which makes un-
tenable distinctions between the 
emperor Saturninus and more 
 recognizably republican fi gures 
such as Marcus Andronicus (101). 
Equally compelling are  similar ar-
guments about Brutus’s arrogation 
of the people in Julius Caesar and 
the founding of the tribunate in 
Coriolanus, which “marks a radical 
transformation—and not for the 
better—in the people’s comport-
ment, manner of speech, and 
 self-conception” (96). The Roman 
citizens of that play, mistakenly 
giving up their voices, are chan-
ged from “smart and confi dent” 
individuals into a disempowered, 
“fi ckle and confused rabble” (96). 
Arnold even demonstrates how we, 
still buying into the rhetoric fi rst 
deployed by the Commons, make 
some of the same mistakes as 
Shakespeare’s characters; for in-
stance, Whig recuperations of the 
play, “for all the importance they 
attach to plebeian speech, do not 
distinguish between speaking for 
oneself and being spoken for by 
representatives,” and in doing so 
such recuperations “construct po-
litical representation precisely as the 
ideology of early modern political 
representation constructs political 
representation” (195). This seems 
exactly right, and to the extent that 
speaking for oneself and being spo-
ken for are confl ated not just in 
some contemporary criticism but in 
contemporary culture—confl ation 
that, given the most recent presi-
dential election, seems fairly blatant 
here in academia—Arnold’s book 
supplies a crucially  important, 
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 clarifying reminder about repre-
sentative democracy’s limits.
The book is perhaps not as fully 
developed when it comes to 
describing what Shakespeare of-
fers as an alternative to the politics 
of representation and that politics’ 
emptying out of the represented. 
The alternative, it turns out, is a 
somewhat vague, undertheorized 
notion of “empowered” selfhood 
that is arguably as suspect as some 
of the notions for which he takes 
Whig critics to task. Arnold 
opposes representational politics to 
a “radically public theater” in 
which people hold onto their 
power; Arnold believes that we 
can see the benefi ts of this most 
clearly when Caesar refuses to take 
the crown offered him by Antony, 
the people celebrate, and Caesar 
must thus refuse the crown twice 
more (42). Here, the people retain 
their “power to judge and decide, 
to turn their thumbs up or down,” 
just as theatrical audiences did (43). 
For this reason Shakespeare, and 
Arnold along with him, think of 
theater as “a model for genuinely 
democratic relations of power,” for 
a politics of presence in which the 
people retain their “will and their 
right to judge their own enemies” 
(144). So for all that Arnold speaks 
of Shakespeare as a radical not 
simply for his time but for our 
own, one main difference between 
his Shakespeare and that of the 
Whigs is between one who favors 
some version of participatory 
democracy and one who favors its 
representative counterpart. People 
should participate directly in gov-
ernment rather than be repre-
sented in it; they should be truly 
empowered and truly protected by 
their governments, their rational 
capacities respected and their 
voices given regard.
Another way to say this is that 
for Arnold as for Whigs—indeed, 
for most historians and literary 
critics invested in recuperating 
English republicanism for the pres-
ent moment—a bounded,  discrete, 
delineated, protoliberal form of in-
dividuality is an assumed political 
good. Arnold speaks of “a tragic 
loss of integrated identity”; Shake-
speare believes that people must 
“retain their power rather than 
 delegate their authority to others” 
(41, 160). Arnold admires the same 
thing that Whigs do about the 
 citizens of Coriolanus—their “au-
dacity and self-possession,” their 
capacity, early in the play, to be “an 
articulate, deliberative, and pur-
poseful group of distinct indi-
viduals” (215, 204). Consider the 
mournful tone with which Arnold 
regards self-loss as the citizens ex-
perience it, once in the introduction 
and again in the epilogue:
When they give up their
assault on the Capitol in ex-
change for the creation of the 
tribunate, they transform a 
power proper to themselves 
into a power that can only be 
exercised by others . . . with 
the steps to the Capitol itself 
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right before them, with  power 
just at their fi ngertips, the 
citizens turn fortune’s wheel 
with their own hands and 
cast themselves down before 
masters of their own creation. 
What makes the Third Citi-
zen’s loss of power so mov-
ing . . . is the concomitant loss 
of the capacity to articulate 
loss and, perhaps, even the 
loss of a selfhood suffi ciently 
integrated to register loss as 
loss. (10)
What name, then, should we 
give to the dramatic fate of 
the Third Citizen, who, when 
we meet him in act I, is in pos-
session of himself and, per-
haps, on the brink of wresting 
power from the patricians but 
who soon believes that he can 
win honor only by recogniz-
ing honor in others, that he 
can ennoble himself only by 
conferring nobility on others, 
that he can make his voice 
heard only by letting others 
speak for him, that he can be 
powerful only by making him 
powerless? (220)
Certainly, having his voice usurped 
by sinister tribunes is not a nice way 
for the Third Citizen to be deprived 
of power. Still, any number of theo-
rists will wonder to what degree we 
can call Arnold’s Shakespeare “rad-
ical.” This Shakespeare is strongly 
attached to bounded selfhood and 
strongly opposed to vulnerability; 
this Shakespeare urges individuals 
to seize the “power just at their fi n-
gertips.” Imagine the exception 
that would be taken by Judith But-
ler, Leo Bersani, Jean Luc-Nancy, 
Giorgio Agamben, and the host of 
others who do not regard “holding 
onto power” as inherently good and 
who see as many salutary forms of 
vulnerability, of letting go of power, 
as pernicious ones. These theorists 
also emphasize how holding onto 
power can itself be pernicious, and 
they might even look to Arnold’s 
characterization of Caesar’s body—
how Romans might have judged 
him were he an enemy—as symp-
tomatic of the dangers of empow-
ered selfhood: “Caesar’s fragile, 
mortal, vulnerable body . . . re-
minds the people of the power they 
once enjoyed in relation to Caesar,” 
Arnold writes. “The body they see 
before them is the body that Caesar 
offered to them after the thwarted 
crowning. The ‘piteous spectacle,’ 
in other words, is, in part, the 
 spectacle of the violence that was 
properly theirs usurped. Caesar 
was once theirs to kill” (175). If 
Caesar being theirs to kill is the 
alterna tive to their being dissolved 
by Brutus, it is diffi cult to see how 
“holding onto power” would be 
much more than a false—or rather 
a literalized—alternative to the vi-
olence of political representation, 
just as tribunes are  elsewhere 
shown to be a false alternative to 
 tyrants.
Even more: we can read the 
texts on which Arnold focuses not 
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only as rejecting the possibility of 
preserving bounded selves when 
representing them, but as aban-
doning bounded, protoliberal self-
hood altogether. These texts ask 
that vulnerability be embraced. In 
Coriolanus, for example, we might 
see this in the eponymous hero’s 
giving over of himself to Aufi dius 
and to death. There are, as well, 
ways to see a republican politics 
founded in the salutary sharing of, 
rather than the defensive attempt 
to eradicate, that vulnerability, and 
it is at least arguable that Shake-
speare’s gestures in such directions 
are more radical than the gestures 
that Arnold deems the bard’s most 
radical: those pitched toward the 
demystifi cations of representation-
alism and toward the empower-
ment that such political clarity 
might effect. Nevertheless, Shake-
speare’s refusal of a politics to which 
many of us still subscribe is striking 
indeed, and Arnold is right to say so 
and to show us how; the brilliance 
of the book resides in  precisely this.
—Case Western Reserve 
University
